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CRIMINAL COURT REFORM IN TAIWAN: A CASE OF
FRAGMENTED REFORM IN A NOT-FRAGMENTED
COURT SYSTEM
Kai-Ping Su†
Abstract: This Article examines the character of Taiwan’s criminal court system
and proposed court reforms. Taiwan’s criminal court is a not-fragmented system, distinct
from the fragmented American criminal court. In fact, with hierarchical control in
prosecutorial rulings and central administration of judicial decision-making, Taiwan’s
criminal court system can be deemed a relatively centralized and bureaucratic organization.
Given this context, when Taiwan’s criminal justice system disappoints the people, judges
take the blame for the failures of the system. To resolve the serious problem of public
distrust in judges and the court system, Taiwan’s government and the judicial authority
make “responding to expectations of the people” the ultimate goal of current court reform.
Nonetheless, although this goal appears to be simple and intuitive, this Article argues that,
due to its fragmented nature, this goal is not equal to its task. This Article further argues
that pursuing the fragmented goal of court reform in a not-fragmented system like Taiwan’s
criminal court may very possibly lead to conflicts of important values and generate a
counterproductive result.
Cite as: Kai-Ping Su, Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan: A Case of Fragmented Reform in
a Not-Fragmented Court System, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203 (2017).

I.

INTRODUCTION
The courts are an institution whose powers are extremely
limited; yet they are frequently called upon to perform
Herculean tasks.1

Taiwan’s court system has faced serious problems of public distrust
since 2010. This crisis of confidence directly led to the resignation of the
president of the Judicial Yuan—the head of Taiwan’s highest judicial
authority and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court—and gave rise to
a series of court reforms. Among the implemented and proposed reforms,
“lay participation” has received the most public interest. The general idea of
lay participation has been promoted by Taiwan’s highest judicial authority
since 2011 and was deemed the most significant issue at the National Affairs
Conference on Judicial Reform in 2017. 2 Why is the general idea of lay
†

Assistant Professor, Institute of Law and Government, National Central University, Taiwan.
J.S.D, LL.M., University of California, Berkeley; LL.M., LL.B., National Taiwan University.
1
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL xiii (1983).
2
While the version of lay participation which Taiwan will adopt is still under discussion, the general
idea of lay participation, that which involves ordinary citizens in trials, has been set as a default reform by
Taiwan’s government and the highest judicial authority. Part IV and Part V of this Article have further
discussion about this phenomenon.
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participation so attractive that Taiwan’s judicial reform embraces it so tightly?
Is lay participation necessary to achieve a particular goal of Taiwan’s court
reform? If so, what is the goal of Taiwan’s court reform? Can this goal, if
achieved, resolve all issues with public confidence?
By examining the nature of Taiwan’s criminal court system and
exploring the goal of Taiwan’s court reform, Part I of this Article attempts to
answer these questions in a historical and functional context. Part II brings to
light the unique “reformed adversarial system” implemented in Taiwan’s
criminal courts and introduces the four procedures that criminal court judges
can choose when trying a case. Under this reformed system, Taiwan’s judges
are empowered to investigate evidence in court and dictate criminal
proceedings. This crucial background information provides context for the
subsequent problem of public distrust and proposed solutions thereof.
With an understanding of this issue, Part III uses Professor Malcolm M.
Feeley’s argument, presented in his classic book “Court Reform on Trial: Why
Simple Solutions Fail,”3 about the feature of fragmentation in the American
criminal justice system, to further explore Taiwan’s criminal courts. Feeley
suggests that fragmentation is the “most visible quality of the criminal court,”4
and further proposes that it is “the central and continuing obstacle[] to change
in the criminal justice system.” 5 This Article uses Feeley’s analytical
approach of the three theoretical bases —the adversary process, due process,
and professionalism 6 —and finds that Taiwan’s criminal court is a notfragmented system. Instead, many mechanisms provided by law and court
practices in Taiwan’s court system contribute to the dominant position of
judges in criminal trials. These mechanisms also compel legal professionals
involved in the system, including judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys,
to collaborate on several common objectives.
Part IV introduces the serious problem of public distrust that Taiwan’s
court system faces. This section explains the incidents that caused the crisis
of confidence and gave birth to the 2017 Judicial Reform Conference.
Although other reforms have been proposed, lay participation has stood out.
Different versions of lay participation have been vigorously and relentlessly
supported by the judicial authority in Taiwan.
3
4
5
6

FEELEY, supra note 1.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 205.
See id. at 11.
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Part V discusses why the judicial authority has deemed lay participation
the remedy for this crisis. This Article uses two analytical structures to
analyze this phenomenon: analysis based on stages of innovation and analysis
based on historical and functional perspectives. In particular, this Article
applies Feeley’s analytical structure of innovation to Taiwan’s court reform.
Additionally, it doubts that the problem of distrust has been diagnosed
correctly, and it furthermore predicts the difficulty of initiation and
implementation in carrying out the reform made by the Judicial Reform
Conference.
Part VI argues that the ultimate goal of Taiwan’s current judicial reform
is “responding to expectations of the people.” 7 Nevertheless, this Article
holds that, even in Taiwan’s not-fragmented criminal court system, a
fragmented goal of reform, like responding to the expectations of the people,
has little chance of succeeding. Due to the fragmentation inherent in this goal
of court reform, planned changes resulting from pursuing this goal will likely
conflict and offset each other and thus may eventually lead to a
counterproductive result.
In conclusion, borrowing Feeley’s words, this Article answers the
question: “Why do simple solutions fail?” in Taiwan’s context. The goal of
responding to the expectations of the people seems like a simple, natural, and
intuitive remedy for the crisis in public trust, but the vague and
overgeneralized nature of this simple remedy undermines its potential to
direct and coordinate distinct values to a successful court reform. Ultimately,
this Article also suggests that the predictable failure of the goal of responding
to the expectations of the people does not necessarily foreshadow the failure
of particular proposals such as lay participation or other planned changes.
Each planned change may still work, but the contradictions and conflicts
between these uncoordinated changes will result in the collapse of the court
reform.

While “(building a judicial system) responding to expectations of the people” was mentioned by
Taiwan’s President Tsai In-Wen with the other two targets, “(building a judicial system) belonging to the
people” and “being trusted by the people,” this Article argues that only “responding to expectations of the
people” is the genuine goal of Taiwan’s court reform. More discussion about “responding to expectations of
the people” can be found infra Section IV.C. Guanyu sifa gaige guo shi huiyi (關於司法改革國是會議)
[About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF.,
https://justice.president.gov.tw/aboutus/3/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
7
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CHARACTERS OF TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM

II.

A.

The “Reformed Adversary System”

In 2002, Taiwan’s criminal justice system transformed its longstanding inquisitorial structure, in which the court was actively involved in
the investigation of facts and was responsible for “finding the truth,”8 into a
so-called “reformed adversary system.” 9 This new system is billed as a
“reformed” one because it is not a typical adversarial system, where the parties
are responsible for presenting evidence before an essentially passive and
neutral adjudicator.10 Instead, Taiwan’s reformed adversarial system can be
viewed as a hybrid of the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system. Its
hybrid nature is particularly apparent in the 2002 amendment of Article 163
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”),11 which provides: “The court
may, for the purpose of discovering the truth, ex officio investigate evidence;
in case for the purpose of maintaining justice or discovering facts that are
critical to the interest of the accused, the court shall ex officio investigate
evidence.”12
Here, in the reformed adversary system, while prosecutors bear the
burden of proof as to the crime charged, 13 judges are also authorized to
investigate evidence in court instead of sitting back and taking a passive
umpire role. In addition, judges are even required to actively investigate
evidence, specifically regarding “maintaining justice or discovering facts that
are critical to the interest of the accused.”14 The lawmakers and advocates for
the hybrid system expected that the aforementioned obligation would prevent
8

For the history and development of Taiwan’s criminal court and procedure, see Tay-sheng Wang,
The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531, 551–54 (2002).
9
Gai liang shi dang shi ren jin xing zhu yi yi (改良式當事人進行主義) can be translated as a
“reformed,” “modified,” or “improved” adversary system. The first two characters “gai” (“改”) and “liang”
(“良”) actually mean “changing” something and making it “better.”
10
See FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 181 (1996).
11
XING SHI SU SONG FA ( 刑 事 訴 訟 法 ) [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 163 (Taiwan)
[hereinafter CRIM. PROC. CODE].
12
Id. art. 163, para. 2 (emphasis added).
13
“The public prosecutor shall bear the burden of proof as to the facts of the crime charged against an
accused, and shall indicate the method of proof.” Id. art. 161, para. 1; “The accused may indicate methods of
proof favorable to him against the facts charged.” Id. art. 161-61.
14
JUDICIAL YUAN (司法院), Gai liang shih dang shih ren jin sing jhu yi (改良式當事人進行主義)
[The Reformed Adversary System], http://www.judicial.gov.tw/work/work02/work02-01.asp (last updated
Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System]
(emphasis added).
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judges from slacking off and that it would involve judges in actively
maintaining justice. In this sense, this new court system is believed to be
better than the pure inquisitorial or adversarial system. Therefore, the new
system was referred to as the “reformed” adversarial system.15
Whether Taiwan’s hybrid criminal court system really functions better
than the typical inquisitorial or adversarial systems is, of course, a matter of
judgment.16 Those who advocate for the new system believe that the word
“reformed” suggests expected improvement to the typical adversarial system.
Generally speaking, Taiwan’s lawmakers are hesitant to embrace a judicial
system where judges are passive observers and decide cases on the materials
provided by the parties. The concern is that if the parties fail to present
evidence, the court will not find the truth and justice cannot be achieved.17
Taiwan’s criminal court system grants judges great power and impact
on trials, as it allows judges to actively investigate cases and discover
evidence. This undermines the lawmakers’ original intention of “drawing a
clear distinction between the duties of prosecutors and those of judges, in
order to establish the impartial status of the court.”18 The new court system
further empowers the judges to select the criminal procedures to dispose of
cases. In practice, this discretionary power over court procedures dictates
later dispositions of cases. A deeper understanding of both the function of
these court procedures and the role judges play in selecting the procedures
provides an insight into why the public has placed such heavy blame on judges
for almost all of the failures of the criminal justice system, and why lay
participation is so strongly considered as a solution of Taiwan’s court reform
to trial.
B.

Criminal Procedures and Discretionary Power of Judges

Taiwan’s CCP provides four different procedures for judges to try a
criminal case. The procedures are: 1) regular trial procedure, 2) simplified
trial procedure, 3) summary procedure without trial, and 4) bargaining
procedure. 19 Although each procedure has its own scope of application
15

Id.
For a more thorough treatment of the success and failure, theory and practice of Taiwan’s reform
adversary system, see, e.g., Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked
Challenge of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’l L. 651 (2009).
17
The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra note 14.
18
Id.
19
CRIM. PROC. CODE arts. 273-1, 273-2, 449, 451-1.
16
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provided by the CCP (as described below), for most criminal offenses, the
judge has great discretion in selecting the procedure. For example, since
regular trial procedure is the most time- and resource-consuming procedure,
the judge has an incentive to select one of the other three procedures to handle
a relatively minor case in order to save the court both time and resources.
1.

Regular Trial Procedure

Among the four criminal procedures, regular trial procedure is the only
one that is adversarial in the reformed adversarial system. If the presiding
judge considers it necessary, regular trial procedure can be used to try any
criminal case, regardless of its seriousness. For example, both murder and
shoplifting can be tried using regular trial procedure, although the other three
procedures can also be applied to the latter minor charge. In a trial of regular
procedure, defendants enjoy all constitutional and legal protections. Among
other things, defendants can confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
hearsay rules also apply. As a result, the duration of a trial using the regular
trial procedure is usually longer than a trial using the other three procedures.
2.

Simplified Trial Procedure

The criminal court may adopt simplified trial procedure to try a case if
the defendant has pled guilty and the charge has a potential punishment of less
than three years imprisonment. 20 In simplified trial procedure, defendants
willingly waive certain crucial legal protections, such as the ability to crossexamine witnesses.21 The “simplified” feature of this proceeding is manifest
in the court process of evidence investigation. For example, hearsay rules do
not apply in this simplified procedure, unless judges deem them necessary. 22
This procedure frees judges from various restrictions on evidence and
investigation. As a result, uncontroversial cases can be terminated quickly,
which saves time and energy for the court and the litigants. However, judges
can always decide to use regular instead of simplified procedure to try cases.23

3.

20
21
22
23

Summary Procedure Without Trial

Id. art. 271-3, para. 1.
Id. art. 273-2.
Id.
Id. art. 273-1, paras. 1–2.
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Minor cases, where offenders are generally subject to punishment other
than serving time in prison, can be handled in summary procedure. This is a
simpler approach than the simplified trial procedure. In summary procedure,
there is no public trial or any proceedings occurring in the courtroom unless
judges deem them necessary.24 If a judge believes that a defendant is guilty
after considering the defendant’s confession and other evidence presented, the
court can use the summary procedure to dispose of the case without officially
initiating a trial. Once the decision is made, which usually occurs in a short
period of time, the written court decision is sent to the defendant.25
While summary procedure is often initiated by a prosecutor’s motion,
judges are not restrained by the motion. In other words, judges can decide to
dispose of the case with regular or simplified trial procedures, even after the
prosecutor files a motion for summary procedure without trial. 26 Judges can
also decide to use summary procedure to terminate a case, even when
prosecutors do not request to apply summary procedure.27 As long as the
punishment in the end is probation, community service, or a fine, it is within
the discretion of judges to use summary procedure.28 Summary procedure has
existed in the CCP since 1935, despite being amended several times.
4.

Bargaining Procedure

Bargaining procedure was implemented in 2004 and is the only
procedure that cannot be initiated based on a judge’s sole discretion.29 Rather,
the decision to use the procedure depends on whether the parties agree and if
the prosecutor makes a motion to the court. When a defendant pleads guilty
to a charge with a potential sentence of less than three years imprisonment
and the defendant is willing to negotiate the range of sentence with
prosecutors, the parties can begin negotiating. 30 However, unlike pleabargaining in the United States, Australia, and other countries, the
negotiations are limited to sentencing ranges and do not involve potential
charges.31
24

Id. art. 449.
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 453, art. 455.
26
Id. art. 449, para. 1.
27
Id. art. 449, para. 2.
28
Id. art. 449, para. 3.
29
Id. art. 455-2.
30
Id.
31
Cf. Paul Marcus et al., A Comparative Look at Plea Bargaining in Australia, Canada, England, New
Zealand, and the United States, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1147 (2016) (comparing plea bargaining processes
in five common law countries and describing the roles of judges and prosecutors in each system).
25
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Charges are never negotiable in Taiwan’s criminal system. The
agreement of sentence range, if made, must be limited to probation, less than
two years imprisonment, or a fine.32 After the agreement has been achieved,
the case must be brought back to court for the judges’ review.33 During the
negotiation process, Taiwan’s prosecutors are not as powerful as American
prosecutors. 34 In Taiwan’s bargaining procedure, negotiable ranges are
limited, and it is judges who will make the final decision. 35 If judges consider
the agreement between the parties inappropriate, the court can reject the
proposal and start another procedure to dispose of the case. 36 If the court
approves the agreement, the defendant will be sentenced within the range
according to their agreement.37
5.

Conflicting Aims and Expectations of Taiwan’s Criminal
Court System

In summary, along with other mechanisms, Taiwan’s reformed
adversarial system provides judges with substantial power over almost all
aspects of criminal trials. Judges can make decisions, actively investigate
evidence, and select procedures to try cases. Under these circumstances, it is
natural that judges are expected to take a leading position in trials and also to
take responsibility for all the legal and social effects of court decisions.
Nonetheless, Taiwan’s judges can barely meet this expectation.
There are two major interests that Taiwan’s criminal court system aims
to address, but unfortunately, they seem to inevitably conflict. First, the court
system expects judges to maintain justice. In other words, when the parties
fail to present crucial evidence related to justice maintenance, judges are
obliged to assume the roles of interested parties in the reformed adversarial
system.38 At the same time, Taiwan’s reformed adversarial system also wants
“the court [to] be deemed fair and impartial.” 39 That is, Taiwan’s court
32

CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 455-4, para. 2.
Id. art. 455-2, para. 1.
34
See Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 101
(2016) (challenging the idea that judicial review should be limited to a marginal extent in the process of pleabargaining).
35
Cf. Marcus et al., supra note 31.
36
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 455-4, para. 1.
37
Cf. Marcus et al., supra note 31.
38
STRIER, supra note 10.
39
The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra note 14
(emphasis added).
33
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system expects its judges to play the impartial role of an indifferent umpire in
addition to the role of an interested party that actively investigates. The two
roles directly conflict.
Alongside these conflicting roles, litigants and society expect that
judges, equipped with seemingly immense power, can always deliver a
“satisfying” decision to the parties and the public. 40 However, this mission is
impossible. As a result, the unreasonably designed court system paired with
the unrealistic expectations of society puts Taiwan’s judges in a predicament.
Consequently, the inability to meet these expectations resulted in
dissatisfaction and disappointment with the judiciary in general, which, in
turn, manifested in the people’s desire for court reform. This is discussed
further in Part IV of this Article.
TAIWAN’S NOT-FRAGMENTED CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM

III.

This section explores Taiwan’s criminal court in light of Feeley’s
theory, identifies the Taiwanese court systems non-fragmented features
(including its clear characteristics of centralization and bureaucracy), and
discusses the mechanisms contributing to its lack of fragmentation. While the
reformed adversarial system and other relevant mechanisms result in
excessive expectation of Taiwan’s judges, these mechanisms also shape
Taiwan’s criminal court system into a unique, not-fragmented system. This
is in contrast to the fragmentation Feeley suggests is rooted in the American
criminal justice system and reinforced by three theoretical bases: the
adversary process, due process, and professionalism. 41 Although the
American and the Taiwanese criminal courts possess the same theoretical
bases, they are different.
A.

The Adversary Process

In the ideal form of the adversarial system, two equally strong and
resourceful advocates compete against each other, with the aim of winning the
case and defeating the opponent. Through the active contest between
adversaries, truth and the most satisfactory results are more likely to emerge. 42
Nevertheless, if parties fail to attack or counterattack, do not provide sufficient
40

For details, see infra Part IV.
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 11.
42
JAMES R. ACKER & DAVID C. BRODY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 444
(2013); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53 (2003).
41
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evidence, or present unconvincing points, judges in the Anglo-American
tradition will not assume the roles of adversaries and refrain from
investigating facts. 43 Therefore, Feeley argues, distinct agencies in the
American justice system lack a common goal to pursue. He further elaborates:
In the United States, there is no ministry of justice, no criminal
justice czar, no one to see that everyone works together to pursue
common objectives. Rather, there are distinct officers—police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges—drawn apart still further
by the doctrine of the separation of powers and the theory of the
adversary process.44
In contrast, both the law and court practices support the idea that the
officers of Taiwan’s criminal court—police, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges—apparently share common objectives. In Taiwan’s reformed
adversary system, these common objectives include discovering the truth,
maintaining justice, and discovering facts that are critical to the interest of the
accused. For discovering the truth, according to the CCP, judges may ex
officio investigate evidence. For maintaining justice or discovering facts
critical to the interest of the accused, judges shall ex officio investigate
evidence. 45 In other words, judges are required by the law to actively
participate in the investigation of evidence when the evidence is substantially
related to justice or the interest of defendants. This special legal duty of
judges demonstrates the emphasized objectives of justice maintenance and
protection of defendants’ rights in Taiwan’s criminal procedure.
The judiciary is not the only institution required by the CCP to devote
itself to these objectives. According to the CCP, the police, prosecutors, and
even defense attorneys are also involved in the pursuit of justice or finding
truth related to rights of defendants. As the CCP Article 2 provides:
(Paragraph 1) A public official who conducts proceedings in a
criminal case shall give equal attention to circumstances both
favorable and unfavorable to an accused.

43
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 11–13; for a detailed discussion about the potential problems inherent
in the adversary system, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
44
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 12–13.
45
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 163, para. 2.
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(Paragraph 2) An accused may request the public official
specified in the preceding paragraph to take necessary measures
favorable to the accused.46
The police and prosecutors are so-called “public official[s]” in the
above text of the CCP and are charged with the legal duty to take care of the
interests of defendants.47 The police and prosecutors are not only responsible
for arresting suspects and prosecuting defendants, but also for seeking justice
and discovering the truth, by giving attention to the circumstances potentially
favorable to the defendant.48
On the other hand, Taiwan’s defense lawyers are required not only to
work for the interest of defendants, but also for justice and public interest.
While this duty of defense lawyers is not explicitly provided by the CCP,49
court practices show that defense lawyers are expected to be an essential
partner, along with judges, prosecutors, and all the other public officials
involved, in pursuing justice and maximizing public interest. The restriction
on defendants’ self-representation in some kinds of criminal trials is an
example of how procedural rules are developed to support the goal of justice.
As the CCP provides, there are six kinds of criminal cases where the defendant
must be represented by a defense attorney. For example, there are cases where
the minimum punishment for the charge is no less than three years
imprisonment. 50 In many cases related to the limit of self-representation,

46

Id. art. 2.
Id.
48
In fact, in the American adversarial justice system, prosecutors similarly do not only expect to
single-mindedly pursue conviction, but rather must seek justice. As the United States Supreme Court clearly
pointed out: “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
49
Cf. LU SHI FA (律師法) [ATTORNEY REGULATION ACT] art.1, para. 1–2 provides, “Attorneys take
upon themselves the goals of promoting social justice, protecting human rights, and contributing to
democratic government and the rule of law. Guided by these professional goals, with the spirit of selfregulation and self-governance attorneys should strive to faithfully execute their professional responsibilities,
contribute to the preservation of social order, and work towards the improvement of the legal system.”
(emphasis added).
50
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 31, para. 1 provides, “In cases where the minimum punishment is no less
than three years imprisonment, where the High Court has jurisdiction over the first instance, or where the
accused is unable to make a complete statement due to unsound mind, the presiding judge shall appoint a
public defender or a lawyer to defend the accused if no defense attorney has been retained; in other cases, if
no defense attorney has been retained by an accused with low income and a request for appointing one has
been submitted, or if it is considered necessary, the same rule shall apply.”
47
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Taiwan’s Highest Court has repeatedly explained the meaning and function
of Taiwan’s criminal court:
[I]n these kinds of cases, the option for defendants to choose to
be represented by a defense attorney or not is limited. [If the
defendant does not hire a defense attorney,] [t]he state will assign
one to the defendant, in order to carry through the defense. By
the expertise of the defense attorneys, it can, first of all, enhance
the defense of the defendant . . . urge judges and prosecutors to
give attention to the circumstance favorable to the defendant, as
provided by the CCP Article 2. Furthermore, it will fill the gap
between the governmental power and the capability of the
defendant, make sure that the parties are substantively equal, so
as to . . . pursue the maximization of the judicial benefit.51
From the opinion expressed above, we can clearly see that defense
attorneys are also deemed an integral component of Taiwan’s criminal court
system, which functions to maximize the public interest. Therefore, instead
of being a fragmented system, Taiwan’s criminal court system is theoretically
and practically expected to be an integrated system where judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and other officials should collaborate with each other to
achieve certain common objectives, including the finding of truth, the
maintenance of justice, and the protection of defendants’ rights.
B.

Due Process

Feeley also holds that the fear-of-authority nature of due process leads
to separated functions, fragmented authority, and circumscribed power. 52
Hence, the power of the state is diminished by the insulation of the judiciary,
meaning that the judiciary is presumably an independent branch of the
government and is not affected by officials of the executive power. Many
rules of criminal procedure are designed more to restrain officials than to
accurately determine if the defendant committed the crime. Feeley also
suggests that the formalism of American criminal procedure grants “vast
discretion at each of several critical stages,” which fosters plea-bargaining in
practice and facilitates fragmentation.53
See, e.g., Tsui Kao Fa Yuen 103 Nien Du Tai Shang Tzu Ti 3150 Hao Pan Jue Jue (最高法院 103
年度台上字第 3150 號判決) [The Highest Court 2014 Tai Appeal No. 3150 Decision].
52
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 13–15.
53
Id.
51
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While due process is also one of the defining characteristics of
Taiwan’s Constitution and criminal procedure,54 it does not appear to create
fragmented authority or separate functions in Taiwan’s criminal court
system. 55 Although it is true that Taiwan’s prosecutors, judges, defense
attorneys, and other agencies involved in the court system have their own
power to exercise and duties to fulfill, these agencies still collaborate to pursue
common objectives, as analyzed in the last section. In this sense, Taiwan’s
criminal court is neither a fragmented system nor an interdependent system.
Instead, it is a system where different agencies are legally and practically
obligated to integrate into one.56
An example of this collaborative feature of Taiwan’s criminal justice
system is the restraint on prosecutors’ discretion. The power and function of
Taiwan’s prosecutors are quite different from those of American prosecutors.
American prosecutors, in Feeley’s words, “have virtually unlimited and
unreviewable discretion in setting charges and in deciding whether or not to
prosecute at all.”57 In Professor Franklin E. Zimring’s words, prosecutors are
“the all-powerful 500-pound gorilla in criminal justice.” 58 American
prosecutors have almost exclusive authority regarding decisions about
whether to file criminal charges, when charges should be brought, what
charges to file, and whom the charges should be brought against. Most
importantly, these prosecutorial decisions are not subject to judicial review. 59

54

ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA (中華民國憲法) [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 8,
para. 1 (2000) (Taiwan) provides, “Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case of
flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise than by a judicial or a
police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished
otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention,
trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted.”
(emphasis added).
55
It is also noteworthy that due process is actually universal in almost all free nations. See RONALD J.
ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81 (3d ed. 2011) (“The idea of due process probably
underlies the law of criminal procedure in all free societies.”).
56
Some scholars distinguish “an interdependent criminal justice system” from “a fragmented criminal
justice non-system.” See, e.g., DAVID W. NEUBAUER & HENRY F. FRADELLA, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7–8 (2015). However, unlike the “interdependent system,” in which different
agencies are interdependent with, and interrelated to, each other to achieve their individual goals, Taiwan’s
agencies of the criminal court system work together towards certain identical, common goals.
57
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 14.
58
Franklin E. Zimring, False Premise of Gun Sentences, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1N1-149791FB586BF7E8.html?refid=easy_hf.
59
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 55, at 961.
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In contrast, Taiwan’s prosecutors are required to make decisions (called
“rulings”) on cases assigned to them within a limited period of time. 60
According to the internal administrative rules granted by the Ministry of
Justice, the due period for completing the investigation of a general criminal
case is eight months, but for cases of “major criminal offenses,” prosecutors
have only four months to make rulings. 61 If prosecutors fail to close a case
within the time limits, they will be urged, admonished, and even punished by
the chief prosecutor or the Ministry of Justice.62
Furthermore, all of the prosecutorial rulings come with corresponding
judicial review or prosecutorial supervision. For example, if the prosecutor
chooses to prosecute a case, the case is then subject to the court’s review.
When the prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, or to defer the
prosecution, the complainants (usually victims or their family) can petition to
the chief prosecutor of the higher level prosecutors’ office for
“reconsideration” of the original ruling. The chief prosecutor has the authority
to set aside the original ruling and send the case back for further investigation
or command the prosecutor to bring a charge.63 If the chief prosecutor affirms
the original ruling of deferred or non-prosecution, the complainant has the
legal right to submit his or her case to a court for setting the case for trial.64
Additionally, the court can eventually intervene to review the prosecutor’s
rulings of deferred or non-prosecution.
Similarly, the discretionary power possessed by American prosecutors
over plea-bargaining is substantially limited for their counterparts in Taiwan.
First, in Taiwan’s bargaining procedure, charges are non-negotiable. The
negotiation between parties can only involve sentences. Second, only
relatively minor offenses are negotiable.65 Those offenses that are subject to
capital punishment, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for more than three
60

Id. at 1055. (“Generally, [American] law enforcement and prosecutors can investigate as long as
necessary and bring criminal charges anytime, provided they don’t run afoul of the applicable statute of
limitations.”).
61
Guidelines, Ministry of Justice, Jian cha ji guan ban an qi xian ji fang zhi ji yan shi shi yao dian (檢
察機關辦案期限及防止稽延實施要點) [Directions for Time Limits for Handling Cases and Prevention
from
Procrastination
for
the
Prosecutors’
Offices],
art.
35,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=C0000001. More serious crimes require less time
because society worries more over serious offenses. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice asks prosecutors to
deal with these cases more quickly.
62
Id. arts. 40, 44, 45, 46.
63
Id. art. 258.
64
Id. arts. 258-1, 258-2, 258-3.
65
Id. art. 455-2.
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years are excluded from the bargaining procedure. 66 Most importantly, as in
other procedures, judges play a crucial role in the bargaining procedure.
Among the four criminal court procedures, bargaining procedure is the only
one that the court cannot initiate by itself. The CCP authorizes the prosecutor
to initiate the bargaining procedure.67 However, before the parties can begin
their negotiation, the bargaining procedure has to be approved by the court.68
After the parties reach an agreement, the court is responsible for reviewing
the agreement to determine whether anything “is obviously inappropriate or
unfair” and whether the agreement is reached in accordance with law before
making the final decision. 69 In this sense, it is still the court making the
decision. The agreement between parties is merely a proposal submitted to
the court for its consideration, and the negotiations never limit the discretion
of the court.
As such, the two most fundamental powers of prosecutors in the
American criminal justice system— the vast discretion in prosecution and the
decision to drop or reduce charges in plea bargaining—are heavily restricted
by Taiwan’s courts and the Ministry of Justice. Taiwan’s prosecutors are
considered components of both a highly centralized prosecutorial system, in
which the authority is the Ministry of Justice, 70 and of the criminal justice
66

Id.
Id. art. 455-2, para. 1 (“Except for those who have committed an offense which is punishable for
sentence of capital punishment, life imprisonment, sentence more than three years, or is adjudicated by the
court of appeal as the court of first instance, once a case has been prosecuted by a prosecutor or applied for
a summary judgment, after consulting with the victim’s opinion the prosecutor may, before the close of oral
arguments in the court of first instance or before the summary judgment, act on his/her own discretion or
upon requests by the defendant, his/her agent or attorney, which has been approved by the court, to negotiate
the following items outside the trial procedure . . . .”) (emphasis added).
68
Id.
69
Id. art. 455-4. (There are seven circumstances provided by art. 455-4, para. 1, under which the court
“may not pronounce a bargaining judgement”:
“1. Where the agreement is withdrawn or where requests for bargaining is revoked pursuant
Paragraph 2 of the preceding article;
2. Where the bargain was not made out of defendant’s free will;
3. Where the bargaining agreement is obviously inappropriate or unfair;
4. Where defendant’s offence may not be subject to a bargaining judgment pursuant to Paragraph
1 of Article 455-2;
5. Where facts established by the court are different from facts agreed in the bargaining process;
6. Where a defendant commits other counts of offense which were arose by the same act in trial
with heavier punishments;
7. Where the court deems proper to pronounce punishment remitted, exemption from prosecution,
or case dismissed.” (emphasis added).
70
See Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle to Guide
the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 654–59 (2005) (discussing the
problems of a decentralized American prosecutorial system and calling for a directive principle to guide the
exercise of discretion by American prosecutors).
67
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system, where the court substantially restrains the power of the prosecutor. In
their daily practice, prosecutors have to carry out the policy goals of the
Ministry of Justice and collaborate with the court to achieve the common
objectives of the court system. Taiwan’s prosecutors are more like a
significant piece of the entire picture of the criminal justice system than like
a fragmented authority.
C.

Professionalism
1.

Frequent Appellate Court Reviews

In Feeley’s opinion, American courts are disorganized because they are
dominated by professionalism, in which “professional norms foster
independence of judgment and autonomy.”71 In addition, Feeley also argues
that American criminal courts are only superficially organized into a
hierarchical, bureaucratic-like structure. In fact, while appellate courts in the
United States are able to supervise the quality of work in lower courts, this
supervision is passive, expensive, and used infrequently.72
Taiwan’s criminal court system has more frequent higher court
supervision than the American system. First, both defendants and prosecutors
have the right to appeal; the protection of double jeopardy in Taiwan does not
prohibit the prosecutor from appealing a not-guilty decision.73 That is, the
appellate courts may take separate appeals from both the prosecutor and the
defendant. In so doing, appellate courts have more chances to review the
decisions of lower courts. Second, the right to appeal to the Highest Court for
a second review is almost absolute. That is, other than some relatively minor
offenses, such as offenses with a maximum punishment of no more than three
years, all other criminal cases are allowed by law to be appealed to the Highest
Court.74 Therefore, decisions of district courts are not the only decisions that
are reviewed. Decisions of High Courts are frequently reviewed and
supervised by the Highest Court. Third, reversal rates for appeals are not
low.75 From 2010 to 2015, the reversal rates of district court decisions was

71

See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 15.
Id.
73
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 344 (“A party who disagrees with the judgment of a lower court may appeal
to the appellate court.” Thus, both defendants and prosecutors can appeal to the appellate court).
74
Id. arts. 375–76.
75
Cf. Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.
uscourts.gov/news/2016 /12/20/just-facts-us-courts-appeals# table2 (from 2011–2015, the United States
72
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27% on average, whereas the reversal rates of High Court decisions was
12%. 76 In summary, compared with the American criminal court system
where prosecutors cannot appeal a not-guilty decision and usually only onetime appellate review from a higher court is allowed, 77 Taiwan’s criminal
court system is designed to permit higher chances of supervision from the
higher courts. Thus, in Taiwan’s system, while deference to professional
judgment is still the norm, the professionalism is relatively restricted and
subject to more supervision.
2.

Pan Li and Jue Yi

In addition, Taiwan’s legal precedents (“Pan li”) and resolutions (“Jue
yi”) are mechanisms that contribute to the compromise of professionalism, as
these limit the discretionary power of judges in deciding cases. Unlike in the
common law system, court decisions on individual cases are not considered
to be a source of law in Taiwan. 78 Nor does a previous court decision have
legal effect in future cases. However, Taiwan’s Pan li system has legal effect
similar to precedent in the American system, but works in a more bureaucratic
way.
In order to unify the legal opinions of courts, Taiwan’s Highest Court
holds judicial conferences to select past decisions of the Highest Court to
become Pan li, namely “precedents of courts.”79 These judicial conferences
are composed of the Highest Court judges, and are usually held ten to twenty
times per year. Pan li does not include the entire text of past court decisions;
instead, short paragraphs are included that refer to crucial legal principles
excerpted from the original court decisions. In this way, Pan li can be applied
to future court cases with distinct facts with similar legal principles.
Other than Pan li, the judicial conference also frequently makes Jue yi,
which literally means the resolution of the judicial conference. Jue yi is a
clear-cut answer to specific legal issues faced by courts. The lower courts
Courts of Appeals reverse rates (appeals resulted in reversals of lower court decisions) for criminal cases
were less than seven percent).
76
See JUDICIAL YUAN (司法院), 司法統計年報 [JUDICIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK] (2010–2015),
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/goa/goa 02.htm.
77
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 55, at 1565–66.
78
WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 39–
40 (4th ed. 2006).
79
FA YUAN ZU ZHI FA (法院組織法) [COURT ORGANIZATION ACT] art. 57 (about the process of setting
up or changing a Pan li).
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may periodically have different legal opinions on the same issues, and they
can submit their opinions or inquiries to the judicial conference of the Highest
Court. In the judicial conference, all the opinions are listed for the reference
of conference members, and the members decide by vote which opinion is
more appropriate for solving the issue. Compared with Pan li, which is an
excerpt of abstract legal principles from past court decisions, Jue yi is a more
specific and concrete process targeting the practical issues currently before
judges.
Both Pan li and Jue yi have a legal effect that is deemed equivalent to
legal regulations. 80 By restricting the professional judgment of criminal
courts, enhancing the consistency between court decisions, and creating a
clearer standard for higher courts to review decisions of lower courts, Pan li
and Jue yi have shaped Taiwan’s criminal courts into an organization which
has more apparent bureaucratic features than those of the American courts.
In summary, where Feeley concluded that the American criminal court
has become fragmented “in its organization, its operations, and its goals,”
through its theoretical bases in the adversary process, due process, and
professionalism, Taiwan’s criminal justice system reveals a different
structure. 81 However, when Taiwan’s criminal justice system is viewed
through the same three theoretical bases, a different structure emerges.
Through the operation of the “reformed adversary system,” Taiwan’s criminal
court emphasizes cooperation more than contest. Theoretically, the court, the
prosecutor, and the defense attorney are aligned to seek several common
objectives, such as maintenance of justice and discovery of the truth.
Furthermore, despite the deference to professional judgment, the discretionary
power of prosecutors is checked by the court, as well as by a highly centralized
prosecutorial system in which the Ministry of Justice has the highest authority.
Taiwan’s criminal courts are also subject to more frequent appellate reviews
and general instructional opinions like Pan li or Jue yi from the Highest Court.
Hence, compared to its American counterpart, Taiwan’s criminal court system
is less fragmented and all of the agencies therein are set up to pursue certain
J.Y. Interpretation No. 374 (司法院大法官釋字第 374 號解釋) (Const. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995),
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=374 (“Due to the fact that [Pan li and
Jue yi] are made according to law (See Article 78 of the Law of Court Organization and Article 32 of the
Regulations Governing the Operational Procedures of the [Highest] Court) and represent the legal opinions
of the [Highest] Court, they shall be deemed equivalent to the regulations mentioned above if they are
invoked by judges in judgments, and thus subject to review by this Council once the people make petition
for interpretation.”).
81
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 9.
80
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common goals. In this sense, Taiwan’s criminal courts seem to avoid the
potential hindrance to court reform that results from the fragmented nature of
the adversary system.82
Despite its lack of fragmentation, over the last two decades Taiwan’s
criminal court system has endured severe criticism and a crisis of confidence.
Ironically, the problem of distrust that Taiwan’s courts are facing quite
possibly resulted from those mechanisms that contribute to Taiwan’s notfragmented court system. The next part of this Article will discuss the crisis
of confidence, analyze the causes, and examine a proposed solution to the
problem: lay participation.
IV.

CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AND COURT REFORM IN TAIWAN
A.

“White Rose Movement”

Due to several judicial corruption scandals and a few widely criticized
court decisions, Taiwan’s criminal court system faces its most severe crisis of
confidence since the reformed adversarial system was implemented in 2002. 83
In 2010, three senior High Court judges and one prosecutor were charged with
corruption. The judges were accused of taking bribes to fix the outcome of a
criminal case, where a former legislator was on trial for corruption. 84
Unfortunately, this scandal confirmed the long held rumors of corruption
among Taiwan’s judiciary and led to the resignations of both the president of
the Judicial Yuan (Taiwan’s highest authority) and the head of the High
Court.85 These scandals brought public outrage to a boiling point.

82

Id. at 31 (“First, the fragmentation and seeming inefficiencies of the courts are inherent in the very
theory and structure of the adversary process and are not simply the result of aberration, overload, or
inadequate personnel.”); see also PAUL B. WICE, COURT REFORM AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: JUDGE GEORGE
NICOLA AND THE NEW JERSEY JUSTICE SYSTEM 18–20 (1995) (“The first problem grows out of the adversarial
nature of the American legal system and has resulted in its highly fragmented structure.”).
83
Wendy Zeldin, Global Legal Monitor Taiwan: Law on Removal of Judges Adopted, But Dinosaur
Judges Might Not Become Extinct, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (July 6, 2011),
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/taiwan-law-on-removal-of-judges-adopted-butdinosaur-judges-might-not-become-extinct/ (“The [Judges] Act’s passage comes in the midst of public
concern over a series of judgments that fell short of the expected outcomes and after a number of cases of
judicial corruption, particularly in connection with High Court judges.”).
84
Cindy Sui, Taiwan Judges on Corruption Charges, BBC NEWS, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-pacific-11711199 (three judges were sentenced to imprisonment of up to 20 years for
corruption in 2013); see Taiwan Judges Sentenced for Corruption, TAIWAN NEWS, Oct. 17, 2013,
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2324367.
85
Ko Shu-ling, Ma Accepts Lai In-jaw’s Resignation, TAIPEI TIMES, July 19, 2010,
http://www.taipeitimes. com/News/front/archives/2010/07/19/2003478271.
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Moreover, in 2010, several controversial court decisions on child
sexual assault cases were profoundly criticized for excessive leniency. These
cases include decisions made by every level of court, including the district
courts, the High Courts, and the Highest Court.86 For example, in a child rape
case, the Highest Court found that the prosecutor failed to prove the accused
had been “acting against the will” of the victim, who was a six-year-old girl.87
In another case, the victim of a sexual molestation was a two-year-old boy.
The offender was sentenced to nine months in prison, but ultimately did not
serve any time in prison; his punishment was suspended and replaced with
probation for two years.88 In addition to the victims’ families, the public was
outraged by these court decisions. The public and media harshly attacked the
court for asking for proof of a six-year-old girl’s expression of unwillingness
to have intercourse with an adult. 89 Taiwan’s judges were broadly criticized
for living in an ivory tower and being out of touch with public concerns.90
The outrage of the public, resulting from both corruption scandals and
controversial court decisions, led to social movements seeking judicial
reform. More than 300,000 people signed a petition requesting to remove
“unqualified” judges.91 Mass dissatisfaction with criminal courts also sparked
several large-scale demonstrations.
Among them, the “White Rose
Movement,” held on September 25, 2010, was the largest protest march in
more than a decade. Fifteen thousand people participated in the protest march,
asking for amendment of the law and removal of unqualified judges.92
86

See Xu Wei-qun, Cong bai mei gui yun dong tan si fa gai ge (從白玫瑰運動談司法改革)
[Discussion on Judicial Reform from the Perspective of “White Rose Movement”], 15(4) TAIWAN B.J. 15
(2011) (discussing why the White Rose Movement could force the judiciary to reform).
87
Zuigao Fayuan 99 Nien Du Tai Shang Tzu Ti 4894 Hao Pan Jue (最高法院 99 年度台上字第 4894
號判決) [The Highest Court 2010 Tai Appeal No. 4894 Decision]. A further analysis of this case and an
introduction to the elements of rape in Taiwan’s Criminal Code can be found infa Section V.B.a.
88
The case number is not disclosed to the public. See Xu, supra note 86.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Taiwan News Quick Take, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
taiwan/archives/2010/09/25/2003483723 (“After having collected more than 300,000 signatures, several
organizations behind the “‘White Rose Movement’” will stage a demonstration on Ketagalan Boulevard in
front of the Presidential Office starting at 6pm tonight to voice their demands to the government. The White
Rose Movement calls for the elimination of judges they consider unsuitable and for a revision to law to
provide better protection against sexual assault for children and people with disabilities. The move was first
initiated by Internet users who were upset about a court verdict last month that gave a man accused of
molesting a six-year-old girl a three-year prison sentence, based on the explanation that the girl did not
explicitly express objection.”).
92
Bao hu hai zi gan zou lan fa guan—bai mei gui yun dong kong su qing pan se lang (保護孩子趕走
爛 法 官 — 白 玫 瑰 運 動 控 訴 輕 判 色 狼 ) [Protect Children, Remove Unqualified Judges—“White Rose
Movement” Accusing Court for Leniently Treating Satyrs], PING GUO RI BAO (蘋果日報) [APPLE DAILY],
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People also started to lash out at judges, calling them “dinosaur
judges.” 93 Allegedly, there are two reasons that judges were called
“dinosaurs.” First, people criticized these judges for having antiquated
thoughts from the time of the dinosaurs. Second, people analogized judges to
dinosaurs, which have immense power but act slowly. 94 The public also
started using another degrading title: “baby judges.” This term is used to refer
to young, unqualified judges who lack the social experiences necessary to
make a sympathetic and satisfying decision. 95
The “White Rose Movement” profoundly contributed to the general
consensus of society that Taiwan’s courts urgently needed reform. 96 In
response, the judicial authority initiated multiple reforms for criminal
procedures.97 Nonetheless, these reforms, even when implemented, did not
appear to solve the problem of public distrust. The figure below shows the
serious crisis of confidence that Taiwan’s courts face. 98 The trend lines
indicate that the majority of people in Taiwan do not trust judges and
prosecutors, especially the former, and that this distrust is growing.

Sept.
26,
2010,
http://www.appledaily.
com.tw/appledaily/article/ headline/20100926/32841220.
93
Liu Kong Zhong, Ping heng le kong long yu bai mei gui (平衡了恐龍與白玫瑰) [Balance Between
“Dinosaurs” and “White Rose”], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO (中國時報) [CHINA TIMES], July 28, 2011.
94
Ye Jun-rong, Kong long fa guan yu kong long fa xue (恐龍法官與恐龍法學) [“Dinosaur” Judges
and “Dinosaur” Jurisprudence], 164 TAIWAN L.J., 41–43 (2010).
95
Lin Meng-huang, Fa guan jiao se fa guan xuan ren yu fa lü ren lun li—cong wa wa fa guan nai zui
fa guan zhi yi sheng lang tan qi (法官角色、法官選任與法律人倫理—從娃娃法官、奶嘴法官質疑聲浪
談起) [Role of Judges, Selection of Judges, and Legal Ethics— Discussion from the Inquiries about “Baby
Judges” and “Pacifier Judges”], 277 TAIWAN L.J. 27, 27–41 (2010).
96
Xu, supra note 86.
97
After the White Rose Movement, the CCP was amended ten times, and sixty-six articles were
amended or added.
98
國立中正大學被害調 查 [NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER,
ANNUAL NATIONWIDE SURVEY ON VICTIMS AND EXTENT OF SATISFACTION ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE,
2008–2015], http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/examine/showExamineList (last visited Apr. 15, 2017) [hereinafter
NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER].
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Figure I: Taiwan’s People Distrust in Judges’ Fairness99
Considering the fact that the efforts made by the judicial system were
attempting to improve people’s confidence in criminal courts, these results
demonstrate that the efforts appear to have been made in vain. However,
among all the reforms proposed, there is one major reform proposal which has
never been passed into law, but has been vigorously and relentlessly supported
by the judicial authority: lay participation.
B.

Lay Participation Proposal of “Guan Shen Zhi”

According to the Judicial Yuan, lay participation is not foreign to
Taiwan’s legal tradition. 100 From 1987 to 2007, the Judicial Yuan drafted
three versions of lay participation proposals, but none were successfully
passed into law. 101 In January 2011, three months after the “White Rose
Movement,” the new president of the Judicial Yuan assumed office and
immediately started promoting an innovative version of lay participation,
“Guan shen zhi.”
The “Guan shen zhi” is different from all the previous proposed
versions of lay participation, which referred to either Germany or Japan, and
99

Id.
Si fa yuan guo min can yu xing shi shen pan zhi tui dong ji xuan dao, guo min san yi zing shi shen
pan wang zhan (司法院國民參與刑事審判之推動及宣導, 國民參與刑事審判網站) [The Promotion and
Announcement of the Judicial Yuan for Lay Participation in Criminal Trials],
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/LayParticipation/intro08.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Lay
Participation in Criminal Trials].
101
Id.
100

December 2017

Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan

225

can be considered a completely new innovation in lay participation.102 “Guan
shen zhi” literally means “a system where trials can be observed.” 103
According to the rules drafted and proposed by the Judicial Yuan in January
2012, 104 laymen are allowed to sit with judges through the trial, to ask
questions about evidence investigation, and to express opinions while judges
make decisions.105 However, they are not lay “judges.” In “Guan shen zhi,”
laymen are not allowed to vote on court decisions, 106 nor are professional
judges limited by the opinions of laymen while making court decisions. 107
From the close timing of the social movement and the initiation of innovative
reform, the intention of the judicial authority for pushing the “Guan shen zhi”
is clear.
Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan had firmly upheld “Guan shen zhi” from 2011
to 2016. Despite the strong support from the authority, the innovation had not
been passed into law. In November 2016, the president and vice president of
the Judicial Yuan supporting “Guan shen zhi” stepped down. The new and
current president of the Judicial Yuan declared that promotion of lay
participation will be one of his major judicial reform objectives, but he will
promote another type of lay participation, not “Guan shen zhi.”108 At the same
time, the president also said that the National Affairs Conference on Judicial
Reform (“the Judicial Reform Conference” or “the Conference”) would

The Judicial Yuan officially translated the system of “Guan shen zhi” (觀審制) as the “Advisory
Jury System.” See Proposal, Judicial Yuan (司法院), Statute on the Pilot Implementation of the Advisory
Jury System in Trial (Draft), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/LayParticipation/law.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2017)
[hereinafter Taiwan’s “Guan shen zhi” Proposal of Judicial Yuan].
103
Therefore, a scholar translated “Guan shen zhi” as “Lay Observer System.” See Yi- Lou,
Establishing a Suitable Lay Participation System for the Taiwanese Criminal Justice System 201 (Nov. 2014)
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Indiana University Maurer School of Law) (on file with Indiana University
Maurer School of Law Library system).
104
Taiwan’s “Guan shen zhi” Proposal of Judicial Yuan, supra note 102.
105
Id. arts. 8, 52, 56.
106
For lay participation in Japan, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in
Japan: The Saiban-in System and Victim Participation in Japan in International Perspectives, 42 INT’L J.L.
CRIME & JUST. 71 (2014); for lay participation in South Korea, see Jae-Hyup Lee, Getting Citizens Involved:
Civil Participation in Judicial Decision-Making in Korea, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 177 (2009).
107
Taiwan’s “Guan shen zhi” Proposal of Judicial Yuan, supra note 102, art. 59, para. 1 (“The judges’
deliberation on the finding of facts, application of laws and the sentence to be imposed shall be decided by
the majority and need not be bound by the Advisory Jurors’ opinions.”).
108
Xu Zong-li (許宗力), 對司法改革與大法官再任問題的看法 [Thoughts on Judiciary Reforms and
Problems With Serving As the Grand Justice Again], 新 頭 殼 [NEWTALK], Sept. 1, 2016,
http://newtalk.tw/news/view/2016-09-01/76838.
102
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decide the new system of lay participation. The Conference concluded in
August 2017.109
C.

National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform

The Conference, which was launched by Taiwan’s President Tsai InWen in 2016, 110 targeted “building a judicial system belonging to people,
responding to the expectations of the people, and being trusted by people.”111
The Conference was composed of five divisions and scheduled to discuss
twenty-one comprehensive issues related to judicial reform. 112 The
committee members include the president of the Judicial Yuan, a former
justice of the Constitutional Court, the Minister of Justice, the head of
Taiwan’s Highest Court, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, NGO representatives,
journalists, medical experts, writers, ex-convicts, a victim’s family member,
a correctional officer, and scholars in a range of topics, including law,
economics, sociology, social work, philosophy, psychology, public health,
and journalism.113 According to the directions for the Conference, more than
half of the 101 committee members are laymen, who are not involved with
the legal profession. 114 It is clear from the diverse backgrounds and
composition of its members that the Judicial Reform Conference intends to
collect thoughts from both legal and non-legal perspectives so that the
proposed reform will respond to the expectations of the people. 115 The
consensus reached in the Conference will be passed on to Taiwan’s
government and the Judicial Yuan for reference when making future judicial
policies. As for lay participation, the Conference has conducted several

ZONG TONG FU SI FA GAIGE GUO SHI HUI YI (總統府司法改革國是會議) [THE NAT’L AFFAIRS
CONF. ON JUDICIAL REFORM, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT], https://justice.president.gov.tw/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2017) [hereinafter J UDICIAL REFORM CONFERENCE HOMEPAGE].
110
President Tsai Launches Judicial Reform in Taiwan, TAIWAN TODAY, July 12, 2016,
http://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=3923.
111
About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7.
112
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OFFICIAL
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REFORM
CONF.,
https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/23 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
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司改國是會議 分組委員名單曝光 [The Member List of the Judicial Reform Conference], 自由時
報 [LIBERTY TIMES], Feb. 17, 2017, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1978579.
114
Id.
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See About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7.
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discussions about the versions possibly being adopted, but has not yet reached
a consensus.116
V.

ANALYSIS: IS LAY PARTICIPATION THE REMEDY?

Lay participation is widely considered the definite court reform and is
therefore worth preliminary analysis. In his book “Court Reform on Trial:
Why Simple Solutions Fail,” Feeley delineates five stages of innovative court
reform—diagnosis, initiation, implementation, routinization, and
evaluation—and indicates each stage has its individual pitfalls. 117 Briefly,
diagnosis (or conception) is the process of identifying problems and
considering solutions. Initiation adds new functions or alters existing
practices. Implementation translates abstract goals into practical practices.
Routinization indicates how an innovation performs over a longer period and
involves the persistent support from an institution for the innovation.
Evaluation is the assessment of new programs, including the assessment of
their experimental stages (diagnosis, initiation, and implementation) as well
as the routine periods (routinization).118 Borrowing this analytical structure,
this section analyzes the first three stages of Taiwan’s lay participation
proposal to probe into the nature of this innovation in court reform. Feeley
also argues, “[f]ocusing on the shortcomings of a single practice without
placing it in historical and functional context usually leads to gross distortion
and exaggeration.” 119 To avoid gross distortion and exaggeration, and to
further develop an understanding of lay participation as a recipe for success,
this section analyzes this phenomenon in a historical and functional context.

A.

Analysis Based on Stages of Innovation
1.

116

Diagnosis

The manuscript of this Article was completed on May 4, 2017, and the last day for division
discussion of the Conference was May 21, 2017. Thus, it is hard to tell if lay participation will become part
of the Conference conclusions. See JUDICIAL REFORM CONFERENCE HOMEPAGE, supra note 109 (containing
the conference schedule).
117
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 35–37.
118
Id.
119
Id. at xiii.
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Diagnosis is the first and most crucial step of innovation. As Feeley
stated, diagnosis is “the process of identifying problems and considering
solutions.” 120 Further, “[d]ifferent perspectives lead people to identify
different problems and suggests different remedies.” 121 Incorrect or
inaccurate diagnosis, therefore, may lead to misidentification of the nature of
problems and produce flawed remedies for these problems. Taiwan’s court
reforms may be an example of inaccurate diagnosis. Faced with the immense
crisis of confidence in the courts, Taiwan’s judicial authority has tried many
approaches to tackling the problem, but all its attempts from 2010 to 2016
failed to win back the public trust. As a result, the judicial reform launched
in 2016 diagnosed the problem as the generalized disappointment with the
judiciary as a whole.122
However, it is questionable whether this diagnosis is accurate or
correct. For starters, this diagnosis is not clear enough to tell us why the
disappointment has been so generalized and undiminished in the last seven
years. The origin of the disappointment and distrust was the corruption
scandal of judges and a few controversial court decisions, as discussed earlier.
Nevertheless, even after the corrupt judges were sentenced, and the CCP was
heavily amended—ten times in seven years—the situation has not improved.
Instead, the annual nationwide survey of public opinions shows that the
people appear to distrust Taiwan’s court system even more as time goes by. 123
The simple diagnosis of “generalized disappointment with the
judiciary,” 124 therefore, does not probe into the causes of the long-lasting
problem of distrust in Taiwan. The authority has not further considered the
mechanisms that keep enlarging the gap between the judiciary and the people
after the “White Rose Movement.” Nor has the authority clarified if
expectations of the people about what the court can do are reasonable.
Instead, to resolve this generalized problem, the government and the judicial
authority conceived of an equally generalized idea of “responding to
120

Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
122
Zong tong fu si fa gai ge guo shi hui yi chou bei wei yuan hui di yi ci chou bei wei yuan hui yi chou
bei wei yuan fa yan jiyao ( 「 總 統 府 司 法 改 革 國 是 會 議 籌 備 委 員 會 」 第 一
次籌備委員會議籌備委員發言紀要 ) [The First Preparation Committee for the Presidential National
Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF.,
https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/4 (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
123
See NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 98, Figure I
(“Taiwan’s People Distrust in Judges’ Fairness”).
124
The First Preparation Committee for the Presidential National Affairs Conference on Judicial
Reform, supra note 122.
121

December 2017

Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan

229

expectations of the people.”125 Nevertheless, responding to the expectations
of the people is more appropriate as a political slogan, as opposed to as a
method for taking actions to address specific problems. This unclear and nondirective policy goal cannot substantively contribute to court reform and will
create inevitable conflicts between reform proposals, as this Article will
discuss in Part VI.
It is also noteworthy that the new president of the Judicial Yuan seemed
to change his opinions after Taiwan’s legislators approved his nomination.
On September 1, 2016, before his nomination was confirmed, the thenpresidential nominee addressed four major issues of court reform, the first of
which was to “clarify the causes of the public distrust.”126 At this time, the
then-nominee stated that “the reason to launch the National Affairs
Conference on Judicial Reform is that people distrust the judicial system.
Therefore, we are thinking about how to tackle this problem. The preeminent
issue is to clarify the causes of the public distrust of the judicial system.”127
Interestingly, on October 25, 2016, when the nomination was
successfully confirmed, the statement of the president-to-be did not mention
the need to “clarify the causes of the public distrust.” Instead, the presidentto-be articulated six concrete reform proposals: insisting on the core values of
the judiciary, promoting trials by specialized courts, reinforcing the functions
of oral argument in court, preventing contradictory court decisions, reducing
the workload of judges to a reasonable range, and establishing the institution
of the Constitutional complaint.128 The change in his opinions is intriguing.
It could mean the president-to-be already “clarified the causes of public
distrust” during his nomination process so that he could articulate the concrete
proposals. On the other hand, it could also suggest that the diagnosis of
problems was “skipped,” because rapid, clear, and definite solutions to the
problems were expected of the new president.129
125

About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7.
Guan Wu-yuan, Tan si gai li nian xu zong li tui dong san shen zhi jia qiang fa zhi jiao yu (談司改
理念 許宗力：推動參審制 加強法治教育) [Talking About Judicial Reform Ideas, Nominee for President
of the Judicial Yuan Xu Zong-li Expects to Promote Lay Participation and Improve Law-Related Education],
LIAN HE BAO (聯合報) [UNITED NEWS], Sept. 1, 2016, https://money.udn.com/money/story/5641/1933179.
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Xu Zong-li, supra note 108.
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張 ( 一 )) [The View of The President of the Judicial Yuan on Judicial Reform, Part 1],
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/headmaster/judReform001.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
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Id. (statement of Xu Zong-li) (“I think, we don’t have much time for . . . an empty talk in the ivory
tower.”); see also FEELEY, supra note 1, at 192 (“It is tempting for reformers to cut through complexities,
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Initiation and Implementation

Feeley precisely describes the tension and conflicts between initiation
and implementation: “a strategy that maximizes the likelihood of successful
initiation—bold language, simplification, and expansive promises—is likely
a strategy that undercuts implementation.”130 He also argues, “[p]roponents
of reform have little incentive to evaluate; they know their ideas are good. For
many, success is defined by the ability to adopt, not implement, a new idea.”131
Taiwan’s Judicial Reform Conference seems to reinforce the tension
between initiators and implementers. One of the defining characters of the
Judicial Reform Conference is that half of the conference members are lay
people, who are not involved with the legal profession. While it is a good idea
to enroll outsiders to initiate the change,132 it is also true that the difficulty in
the stage of implementation is less perceivable to people unfamiliar with the
practice of the system. A member of the Judicial Reform Conference who is
also a law professor described the Conference as “making a hundred wishes,”
referencing the disorder and fragmented issues discussed in the Conference.133
B.

Analysis Based on Historical and Functional Perspectives

Lay participation has been strongly supported by Taiwan’s judicial
authority since 2011. It has never been successfully passed into law, but the
Judicial Yuan stopped advocating for lay participation in different versions as
a major court reform. From 2011 to 2016, the Judicial Yuan had relentlessly
pushed the “Guan shen zhi” version of lay participation. Although the attempt
failed, and the supportive president and vice president of the Judicial Yuan
both stepped down, the successor still embraces the idea of lay participation.
In the Judicial Reform Conference, committee members deemed lay
participation as “the most important issue of all.”134 It is also noteworthy that
point out enemies, and offer bold strategies . . . But these very strategies that facilitate innovation undercut
implementation.”).
130
See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 36.
131
Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
132
Id. at 196–97.
133
司改放天燈，小心燎原難收拾 [Treating Judicial Reform as Flying Lanterns (Making Wishes
Without Considering the Price) Can Be A Disaster], 聯 合 報 [UNITED NEWS], Apr. 17, 2017,
https://udn.com/news/story/7338/2407455.
134
Transcript, 第四分組第一次會議 [The First Division IV Judicial Reform Conference],
http://justice.sayit.mysociety.org/%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E5%BA%9C%E5%8F%B8%E6%B
3%95%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E5%9C%8B%E6%98%AF%E6%9C%83%E8%AD%B0%E7%AC%
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the mainstream discussion about lay participation is not whether Taiwan’s
court trials should have lay participation, but which kind of lay participation
is better for Taiwan. Lay participation has almost become a default reform.135
Regarding the untiring support and promotion of Taiwan’s government and
the judicial authority for lay participation, an essential question to ask is: why
is lay participation so attractive to legal reformers, especially the judicial
authority? This inquiry can be explored in both historical and functional
contexts.
C.

Analysis in the Historical Context

Historically speaking, the implementation of the reformed adversary
system in 2002 is a remote but fundamental cause of the problem of public
distrust, which leads to lay participation and other reform proposals. As
mentioned in Part II, the reformed adversary system aimed to distinguish
between the duties of judges and prosecutors. 136 In so doing, reformers
expected to establish an image that judges are fair, impartial, and only
responsible for making the final decision in cases using evidence presented by
the parties. However, due to their reluctance to wholeheartedly embrace the
passive role of judges, the lawmakers chose to keep the essence of the
inquisitorial system within the new criminal court system. Thus, judges are
still empowered to actively investigate evidence. The rule that judges shall ex
officio investigate evidence related to justice maintenance and defendants’
rights further reinforces judges’ involvement and their decisive role in
Taiwan’s criminal courts.137 If judges did not actively investigate evidence,
and the evidence was considered to be related to justice maintenance or
defendants’ rights by the appellate court, lower court decisions would be
reversed.138 Few judges wish to run this risk. Yet there is no restriction or
punishment provided by the CCP to prohibit judges from investigating “too
AC%E5%9B%9B%E5%88%86%E7%B5%84/%E7%AC%AC%E5%9B%9B%E5%88%86%E7%B5%84
%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E6%AC%A1%E6%9C%83%E8%AD%B0 [hereinafter Transcript].
135
Video, 總統府司法改革國是會議第四分組第一次增開會議 [The First Division IV Judicial
Reform Conference in the Presidential Palace], 中 華 民 國 律 師 公 會 全 國 聯 合 會 、
財團法人民間司法改革基金會 [National Federation of Lawyers Association of the R.O.C., Found. for Civil
Justice Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF., https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/27 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2017) (discussing whether “Taiwan should implement a jury trial system where all the facts
are found by citizens or a system where judges and citizens decide the case together.”).
136
See generally The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra
note 14; CRIM. PROC. CODE.
137
For details, see supra Section II.A.
138
The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra note 14;
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 256.
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much” or from considering unimportant evidence. Therefore, lower court
judges have incentive to investigate evidence that seems obviously trivial to
prevent missing any points that a higher court may later deem important. In
addition, many other mechanisms, such as discretionary power over criminal
procedure selection, also contribute to the leading role of judges in court, as
discussed in Part II. Overall, judges are greatly empowered by the reformed
adversary system, as well as by other mechanisms in Taiwan’s criminal
procedure, making judges the very incarnation of Taiwan’s justice system.
However, with great power comes even greater responsibility and
expectations. The parties, along with society as a whole, naturally expect that
judges with such immense power can make decisions that will satisfy
everyone, but this is beyond the capacity of the court. For example, for the
major child rape case resulting in the “White Rose Movement,” the public and
media severely criticized the Highest Court decision, which asked the lower
court to re-investigate “whether the offense was against the will of the sixyear-old victim.”139 However, while the public deemed this court decision
ridiculous,140 many legal scholars argued that this decision was legitimate. 141
Scholars argued this court decision was made correctly, following the
fundamental principle of “nullum crimen sine lege,”142 which requires that no
person should face criminal punishment for doing things that were not
criminalized by law. As the Criminal Code requires the offense of rape to be
“against the will” of the victim,143 this element must be investigated before
the court makes a decision.144 That is to say, despite the harsh criticism, the
139
Protect Children, Remove Unqualified Judges—“White Rose Movement” Accusing Court for
Leniently Treating Satyrs, supra note 92.
140
Id.
141
See, e.g., Lu Ying-jie (盧映潔), 「意不意願」很重要嗎?評高雄地方法院九十九年訴字第四二
二號判決暨最高法院九十九年第七次刑庭決議 [Does Willingness Matter? Comments on Kaohsiung
District Court 2010 suzi No.422 Decision and the Highest Court 2010 the 7th Criminal Conference Jue Yi],
186 月旦法學雜誌 [TAIWAN L. REV.] 164 (2010); Cai Sheng-wei (蔡聖偉), 論「對幼童性交罪」與「強
制性交罪」.的關係評最高法院九十九年第七次刑事庭決議 [Discussion on the Relationship Between
“Offense of Sexual Intercourse with Child” and “Offense of Rape” and Comments on the Highest Court
2010 the 7th Criminal Conference Jue Yi] , 8 裁判時報 [COURT CASE TIMES] 65 (2011); Li Jia-wen (李佳
玟), 違反罪刑法定的正義 [The Justice in Violation of the Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege], 160 台
灣法學雜誌 [TAIWAN L.J.] 1 (2010).
142
WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 875–77 (2012).
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中華民國刑法 [CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 221, para. 1 (“A person who by
threats, violence, intimidation, inducing hypnosis, or other means against the will of a male or female and
who has sexual intercourse with such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years
but not more than ten years.”) (emphasis added) (Taiwan).
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decision of the Highest Court was legitimate. However, the members of the
public who were outraged by the Highest Court decision did not accept this
reasoning. As a result, in 2011, when Taiwan’s president nominated one of
the judges presiding over this case for the Justice of Taiwan’s Constitutional
Court, public opinion from the fallout of the case required the judge to give
up her nomination.145
This example reveals the gap between the expectations of the people
and restrictions on the criminal court as a legal institution. The functions of
criminal courts are in fact restricted by social reality and numerous legal rules.
Nevertheless, these restrictions are hard for Taiwan’s people to perceive
because judges seem to have omnipotent power to dictate criminal
proceedings. This omnipotent image of judges is probably the last thing that
the advocates of the reformed adversary system would like to see. However,
in the historical context, it is clear how Taiwan’s previous innovation of the
reformed adversary system has contributed to this consequence. In a word,
the criminal court is often expected to achieve goals beyond its capacity, and
judges are deemed accountable for all flaws and failures of the criminal justice
system. Under these circumstances, the public’s dissatisfaction and distrust
of courts and judges is inevitably reinforced. As a consequence, judges are
blamed for falling short of expectations and become the target of court reform.
In response to the public distrust of judges, lay participation appears to be a
simple and intuitive approach to a change in judges’ authority.

D.

Analysis in the Functional Context

Functionally speaking, lay participation has most likely been attractive
to the public because it seems like the most intuitive and simple solution to
the crisis of confidence. According to the Judicial Yuan, the first reason for
promoting the “Guan shen zhi” version of lay participation was that it could
“increase the transparency of the judiciary and improve the trust of people in

144
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courts.” 146 Taiwan’s judicial authority and advocates of lay participation
generally believe that the deep-seated antipathy against judges is mainly
because the public lacks a correct understanding of court functions in practice.
If they can “add seats for people” in the courtroom, the advocates of lay
participation believe it will improve the transparency and trust in the court and
will facilitate a better understanding of the process.147
The intention of reformers explains why Taiwan’s judicial authority
strongly promoted the “Guan shen zhi” as a system where lay people cannot
vote for court decisions. Now that the problem of distrust is diagnosed by the
judicial authority as a “lack of understanding of courts and judges,” the
solution then can be as simple as making ordinary people sit in the court
through the entire proceedings. A widely held belief of the advocates of the
“Guan shen zhi” is that in so doing, even without being authorized to make
decisions, ordinary people can learn how courts and judges function so that
misunderstandings can be clarified. With an enhanced understanding of court
proceedings, advocates expect that people will comprehend the meaning of
trial, sympathize with court decisions, and recover their confidence in the
judicial system.148 Therefore, even though the former president of the Judicial
Yuan failed to pass the “Guan shen zhi” version of lay participation into law,
his current successor still expects other patterns of lay participation can help
the judicial system win back the trust of people.149

The other two reasons were that “the diverse composition of courts can make court decisions close
to the will of people” and “lay participation can work as a means of law-related education to improve the
understanding of judicial system.” See Lay Participation in Criminal Trials, supra note 100.
147
Lin Jun-yi (林俊益), Ren min guan shen zhi zhi jian gou yi (人民觀審制之建構（一）) [The
Construction of Guan Shen Zhi, Chapter One], 58 軍法專刊 [MARTIAL L. J.] 23 (2012).
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Breeds Respect: Organizing and Studying a Courtwatch, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 61 (2006); However, whether
familiarity will breed respect or contempt in Taiwan is an empirical question. It is noteworthy that an
empirical study of the public attitudes toward the judicial system in Taiwan in 2011 showed that people who
had court experience had even lower trust than those who had not, which is against the assumption that
“familiarity breeds respect.” See Huang Kuo-Chang et al. (黃國昌等), Explaining Public Attitudes toward
the Judicial System: The Case of Taiwan, 1 台灣政治學看刊 [TAIWANESE POL. SCI. REV.] 21 (2017),
available at http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/kongpin/3.pdf.
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In addition, the failure of other efforts at regaining the trust of the
people is another functional reason that the judicial authority has firmly
upheld the idea of lay participation. From 2010 to 2016, except for
successfully passing the proposed lay participation of “Guan shen zhi” into
law, the judicial authority had tried everything it could to win back the public
trust. As for the reform on criminal courts, the Code of Criminal Procedure
had been amended ten times, changing 66 articles. The judicial reform also
expanded to almost all areas of the judiciary, including reform of civil courts
and administrative courts, establishment of the Judicial Evaluation
Committee, a change in personnel system, implementation of the Code of
Conduct for Judges, and so on.150 These innovations, unfortunately, did not
work to regain the confidence of people in the court system. Since 2010,
nationwide surveys show more than 75% of people doubt the fairness and
impartiality of judges in making decisions.151 Indeed, in 2015, the nationwide
survey showed that 85% of Taiwan’s people did not trust judges, a historically
high number.152 In 2016, another survey showed that judges were the least
trusted profession in Taiwan. 153 In 2017, in a survey about the public
impression on Taiwan’s officials, judges were again ranked the least trusted
officials in Taiwan. 154 Given that so many other reforms didn’t re-establish
the confidence in the court system, lay participation is perhaps the last option
available to the judicial authority for regaining trust.
VI.

A FRAGMENTED GOAL OF COURT REFORM
A.

“Responding to Expectations of the People”

From the above analyses, it is clear that lay participation is not a goal
in its own right of Taiwan’s court reform. Rather, lay participation is the
150

JUDICIAL YUAN (司法院), Fa guan ren shi gai ge cheng xiao ping gu wei yuan hui (法官人事改革
成
效
評
估
委
員
會
)
[Judicial
Evaluation
Committee],
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/revolution/judReform10.asp (last visited May 1, 2017) (introducing Taiwan’s
judicial reform policies implemented from 2011–2016).
151
NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 98.
152
Id.
153
Xiong Yi-xi, Bao gao xiao ying zong tong fa guan xin ren du diao che wei si fa gai ge bu neng deng
(報告小英總統：法官信任度吊車尾 司法改革不能等) [Report to President Tsai: Judges Are The Least
Trusted Profession. Judicial Reform Can’t Wait], TIAN XIA ZA ZHI (天下雜誌) [COMMONWEALTH MAG.]
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154
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means to a particular objective: responding to the expectations of ordinary
people. As articulated in the statement of the National Affairs Conference on
Judicial Reform, the objectives of reform are building a judicial system
belonging to the people, responding to the expectations of the people, and
being trusted by the people.155 If we read these objectives carefully, we may
find that building a judicial system belonging to the people and being trusted
by the people are regarded as the achievements of a successful reform, rather
than as substantive means to reform. Conversely, responding to the
expectations of the people is the basis for taking action. Responding to the
expectations of the people seems to be a concrete goal for legal reform
because the expectations of the people are concrete and some of them are
seemingly achievable.
In many proposed or implemented court reforms in Taiwan, we can see
that responding to the expectations of the people has been taken as the policy
goal of Taiwan’s court reform. For example, in the first meeting of the
preparatory conference for launching the National Affairs Conference on
Judicial Reform, Taiwan’s President Tsai In-wen delivered an opening speech
focusing on the expectations of the people:
I know that Taiwan’s people have very high expectation of court
reform. People expect that the judiciary can be more impartial.
No “dinosaur judges.” No “life or death depends on wealth.”
People also expect the judiciary can be more efficient, so that
their normal life won’t be affected by the lengthy proceedings.156
President Tsai’s speech revealed the overall objective of Taiwan’s
ongoing court reform: responding to the expectations of the people. If
responding to the expectations of the people is the core of reform, no wonder
lay participation is considered “the most important of all” in the Judicial
Reform Conference.157 After all, lay participation itself is a device designed
for incorporating the opinions of ordinary people in court decisions and
increasing public trust in the judiciary. 158 That is, by incorporating the
155
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opinions of lay people in particular cases, court decisions can be deemed, in a
sense, the fulfillment of “responding to the expectations of the people.”
B.

Pitfalls of the Fragmented Goal

However, is responding to the expectations of the people an appropriate
goal of Taiwan’s court reform? It may be quite doubtful. First of all, a policy
goal has to be clear and directive; it must be clear enough that everyone
involved in implementing it has the same understanding of what it is, and it
must be able to direct all involved efforts towards that end. The idea of
responding to the expectations of the people, however, is neither clear nor
directive. A court system that can respond to the expectations of the people
sounds very attractive, but it is almost impossible to define what expectations
of the people means in this context. Each person has his or her own likes and
dislikes. One person’s meat may be another person’s poison. In any legal
contest, when a party wins the case, entirely or partly, the other party loses.
Trials are, after all, a zero sum game. If responding to expectations is difficult
to achieve in a single case, how can it be achieved in the far more complex
context of society as a whole?
Some may argue that the public may share some common expectations,
and the meaning of responding to the expectations of the people is simply to
meet these common expectations. 159 Some expectations are general. For
example, perhaps all people expect an impartial, fair, and speedy trial, a more
transparent court, and a court that protects human rights. Nevertheless, even
these common goals suffer from their lack of clear definition. Judges may
believe they are fair and impartial, but at least one party (more often, both
parties) feels otherwise. A court may spend three months finishing the trial
of a complex case without unnecessary delay, but the victim and the public
may still accuse the court of inertia. Responding to the expectations of the
people is actually an abstract notion, which fails to provide a clear definition
for what expectations are to be achieved.
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More importantly, expectations of individuals may conflict with each
other. For example, a fair and impartial trial may require a complete and
detailed investigation of evidence, which takes a lot of time to the detriment
of having a speedy trial. A transparent court may be expected to provide as
much information as possible to the public, which is at the expense of the
privacy of the litigants. All of these values comprising various expectations
of the people are important, but none of them is preeminent. When these
values conflict with each other, the conflict leads to a compromise of some
values, which can give the appearance that the court failed to meet its
objective. That is why an appropriate policy goal of court reform must be
directive, so that the values with potential conflicts may be decided on the
basis of a higher policy objective.
Without a clearly-defined and directive policy objective, the ongoing
Judicial Reform Conference may make the balance between crucial values
worse, not better. For example, one of the six major issues that the current
president of the Judicial Yuan emphasizes regarding court reform is to
transform the court into one with greater specialization.160 According to the
president, courts should be specialized on topics, such as food safety,
electronic information, environmental protection, architecture, medical
treatment, and so on.161 This reform may be achieved by means of training
judges, establishing specialty courts, and introducing experts of diverse
specialties into the court system. But how does this reform impact lay
participation, which is “the most important of all” of the current court
reforms?162 A specialized court is helpful for solving cases more accurately
and professionally, but it can also make the trial more complex and difficult
to comprehend for lay judges. Given this conflict, which important value of
reform should be comprised? The policy goal of Taiwan’s court reform,
responding to the expectations of the people, cannot provide a solution to the
value conflicts, because lay participation and more professional courts are
both expectations of the people. The question at issue is not which value is
more significant than the other, but instead, what policy goal of court reforms
must be directive in order to guide a solution to these dilemmas?
Unfortunately, responding to the expectations of the people is not up to this
task.
160
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In summary, responding to the expectations of the people may be a
good political slogan, but it is not a suitable policy goal for court reform.
When applying a goal that is intrinsically fragmented, it will, at best, cause
the effort to be made in vain. At worst, it will have a counterproductive result.
All of these efforts towards the fragmented goal of responding to the
expectations of the people may very possibly clash with each other and offset
the important values of each other.
VII.

CONCLUSION: WHY DO SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL?

Borrowing the subtitle of Feeley’s masterpiece “Court Reform on Trial:
Why Simple Solutions Fail,” this section will sum up the thesis by recapping
the nature of Taiwan’s criminal court system and the feature of its current
court reform. Distinct from the fragmented American criminal court,
Taiwan’s criminal court is a not-fragmented system. With hierarchical control
in prosecutorial rulings and central administration of judicial decisionmaking, Taiwan’s court system can be deemed a relatively centralized and
bureaucratic organization. In this system, the role of judges is designed to be
that of the leading character in resolving all disagreements between parties
and conflicts of interest. At the same time, Taiwan’s judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys are obligated to pursue common objectives, including
maintaining justice and discovering facts that are critical to the interest of the
accused. Since Taiwan’s criminal court system is not-fragmented, it seems to
be able to avoid the pitfalls inherent in a fragmented justice system like the
American system.
However, this not-fragmented court system has faced a serious crisis of
confidence. The same mechanisms in criminal procedure that contribute to a
not-fragmented court system also result in over-expectations of the people
about what courts can do. Due to controversial court decisions and corruption
scandals involving judges since 2010, more than 75% of Taiwanese people
distrust judges since 2010.163 After many failed attempts gain back trust, the
government and the judicial authority eventually diagnosed the problem as
generalized dissatisfaction and disappointment in the judiciary. The current
president of Taiwan believes that responding to the expectations of the people
is the recipe for success. To achieve this goal, the National Affairs
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Conference on Judicial Reform is taking place to discuss concrete policies and
details.
Although the solution of responding to the expectations of the people
appears to be simple and intuitive, the cause of distrust is inaccurately or
incorrectly diagnosed, and the solution to distrust is intrinsically fragmented.
Derived from its fragmented nature, the reform goal of responding to the
expectations of the people is unclear, over generalized, and not directive. In
Taiwan’s not-fragmented court system, pursuing a fragmented goal in court
reform will, at best, lead to efforts that are in vain; often, it may lead to a
counterproductive result.
However, the above findings and perspectives of this Article must be
interpreted with caution. By saying that the problem of public distrust was
diagnosed inaccurately and the solution was constructed inappropriately, this
Article does not mean to say that lay participation and other planned changes
will inevitably fail. Instead, each planned change may work out in its own
right. Nevertheless, it is exactly these planned changes that, if successful, may
clash with each other, offset the effects of each other, and lead to a
counterproductive result.

